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review. Substantive due process, or reasonableness, in the administrative
exercise of the quasi-legislative function will be examined, but it is not
certain whether the citizen must present to the board in the first instance
the evidence from which he draws his claim of unreasonableness or
whether he may retain that evidence for presentation in court upon
review.
The bar may well consider decisions of the Court with particular emphasis on the facts and the practical effect of the decision on the parties in
the individual case. The Court has usually reached sound conclusions,
although its reasons have not always been logically consistent. The resulting conflict of terminology, intermingled with the phraseology necessary to fit the action to the ancient writs used for review, may not be
eliminated easily. Careful and discerning preparation of appellate briefs
is required as an aid to the Court, inasmuch as its present rush of work
49
places a greater responsibility upon the bar than ever before.
JAMMs W. MIMDLETON

TAX TITLE: PURCHASE BY CO-TENANT
OR JOINT REMAINDERMAN IN EXPECTANCY
A person is disqualified to purchase a tax title when such purchase
would enable him to take advantage of his own default in payment of
taxes to strengthen his own title or to cut off the interests of other persons in the land.' By the same token, a person who stands in a fiduciary capacity toward the person upon whom the duty rests to pay taxes
is"disqualified to purchase a tax title and to assert it for his own exclusive benefit. 2 Although there are many different situations to which
"°See Thomas, Justice Without Delay, 2 U. os" FLA. L. REv. 1 (1949).
1

Mcflroy v. Fugitt, 182 Ark. 1017, 33 S. W.2d 719 (1931); Clermont-Minneola
Country Club v. Coupland, 106 Fla. 111, 143 So. 133 (1932); Petty v. Mays,

19 Fla. 652 (1883); Hanna v. Palmer, 194 Ill. 41, 61 N. E. 1051 (1901); Koch
v. Kiron State Bank, 230 Iowa 206, 297 N. W. 450 (1941); Waring v. Nat. Sav. & T.
Co., 138 Md. 367, 114 AUt.

57 (1921); Heilwig v.

Nybeck, 179 Mich. 292,

146

N. W. 141 (1914).
2Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black 613 (U. S. 1862); Charles E. Gibson Co. v. Elze,
88 Colo. 181, 293 Pac. 958 (1930); Buffum v. Lytle, 66 Fla. 355, 63 So. 717
(1913); Tegert v. Lambach, 226 Iowa 1346, 286 N. W. 522 (1939); Layton v.
Balcom, 64 N. H. 92, 6 Ad. 37 (1886); Morris v. Joseph, 1 W. Va. 256 (1866).
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these principles can be applied,3 the purpose of this note is to examine
their application to co-owners of an interest in land, present or future.
I. THE GExmtAL RULE
One co-tenant may not purchase a tax title to the common property
and assert it for his own exclusive benefit. 4 He is regarded as having
acquired it for the benefit of all co-tenants, provided they seasonably
offer to contribute to the expense of purchasing the tax title. 5 Some
cases state that the rule is predicated on the concept that a relation of
trust and confidence will be implied between co-tenants by reason of
their common interest in the whole land. This concept prevents one
co-tenant from taking any personal advantage of acts touching the common title of the subject-matter of the trust placed upon him. 6 Other
cases merely say that, since the duty to pay taxes rests upon all cotenants equally, any one of them is disqualified to purchase a tax title in
default of their mutual duty to pay the taxes.7 Both of these reasons
'McRae v. Preston, 54 Fla. 190, 44 So. 946 (1907) (agent); Gamble v. Hamnilton, 31 Fla. 401, 12 So. 229 (1893) (agent); J.ordan v. Sayre, 29 Fla. 100, 10
So. 823 (1892) (mortgage); Cunningham v. Jones, 37 Kan. 477, 15 Pac. 572 (1887)
(attorney); Collins v. Hoffman, 62 Wash. 278, 113 Pac. 625 (1911) (director of
corporation); Grant v. Burton, 26 S. D. 52, 127 N. W. 480 (1910) (husband and
wife). But see Willard v. Ames, 130 Ind. 351, 30 N. E. 210 (1892) (purchase with
wife's own money); Hildie v. Eckhart, 203 Mich. 346, 169 N. W. 14 (1918) (after
death of husband).
E.g., Spencer v. Spencer, 36 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1948); Andrews v. Andrews,
155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205 (1945); Williams v. Clyatt, 53 Fla. 987, 43 So. 441
(1907); Biggins v. Dufficy, 262 IlL 26, 104 N. E. 180 (1914); Lawton v. Estes,
167 Mass. 181, 45 N. E. 90 (1896); Egan v. Egan, 98 N. J. Eq. 487, 131 AUt. 129
(1925); Gass v. Waterhouse, 61 S.W. 450 (Tenn. 1900); Allen v. Allen, 114 Wis
615, 91 N. W. 218 (1902).
'Gilb v. O'Neill, 225 Ala. 92, 142 So. 397 (1932); Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho
576, 123 Pac. 487 (1912); Lee v. Fox, 36 Ky. 171 (1838); Harrell v. Harrell,
174 La. 957, 142 So. 138 (1932); Doiron v. Lock, M. & Co., 165 La. 57, 115 So.
366 (1927); Duson v. Roos, 123 La. 835, 49 So. 590 (1909); Gulf Refining Co. v.
Hart, 130 La. 51, 57 So. 581 (1912); Egan v. Egan, 98 N. J. Eq. 487, 131 At.
129 (1925).
'Spencer v. Spencer, 36 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1948); Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654,
21 So.2d 205 (1945); Williams v. Clyatt, 53 Fla. 987, 43 So. 441 (1907); Weare v.
Van Meter, 42 Iowa 128 (1875); Venable v. Beauchamp, 33 Ky. 321 (1836);
Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns Ch. 388 (N. Y. 1821) (outstanding title); Lloyd v.
Lynch, 28 Pa. 419 (1857).
'Choteau v. Jones, 11 Ill. 300 (1849); Dubois v. Candpau, 24 MIch. 360 (1872);
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fit equally well within the general principle that a person cannot purchase a tax title if under a duty to pay the tax or obligated, even by implication, not to do so in violation of trust.8 The rule is applied to tenants by the entirety,9 joint tenants,10 co-parceners," and very often
to tenants in common. 12 Upon principles of agency, the rule is applied
with equal force to purchases by one co-tenant of the tax title from a
3
stranger acting in fraud or collusion, demonstrated or implied.'
II.

LImITATIONS OV THE GENERAL RULE

The general rule applies during the existence of the co-tenancy relation only. 14 Consequently, a tax title purchased by a co-tenant before
the beginning or after the termination of the co-tenancy may be held for
the exclusive benefit of the purchaser.' 5 Some courts have gone to the
extent of holding that one co-tenant may claim the exclusive benefit of
a tax title when it is based on taxes becoming delinquent before the cotenancy began.' 6 Other courts, however, make no such distinction and
require that the tax deed must have been issued before the co-tenancy
began.' 7 Although the Supreme Court of Florida has not discussed this
problem, the latter view is presumably the law of Florida; in Spencer v.
Spencer'8 the tax title involved was based on taxes that had become deLacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140 (1856); Downer v. Smith, 38 Vt. 464 (1866); see
Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 369, 375 (1866) (dissenting opinion).
14 TnomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY §1862 (Penn. ed. 1940).
"Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205 (1945); Busch v. Huston,

75 Ill. 343 (1874); Burns v. Byrne, 45 Iowa 285 (1876); Grant v. Burton, 26 S. D.
52, 127 N. W. 480 (1910).

"Mason v. Barrett, 295 Ky. 462, 174 S. W.2d 702 (1943).
"Williams v. Clyatt, 53 Fla. 987, 43 So. 441 (1907).

"See Dahlstrom v. Beard Fruit Co., 73 Wash. 13, 131 Pac. 450, 451 (1913).
"Inman v. Quirey, 128 Ark. 605, 194 S. W. 858 (1917); Spencer v. Spencer, 36
So.2d 424 (Fla. 1948); Peabody v. Burri, 255 ll. 592, 99 N. E. 690 (1912); Duson

v. Roos, 123 La. 835, 49 So. 590 (1909); Dubois v. Campau, 24 Mich. 360 (1872).
"See Ford v. Jellico Grocery Co., 194 Ky. 522, 240 S. W. 65, 67 (1922) (coextensive with existence of the relationship); Fuller v. Dennistoun, 164 Minn. 160,
204 N. W. 958, 959 (1925) (outstanding title).
"See note 14 supra.
"Stafford v. Nat. Granite Co., 70 Colo. 572, 203 Pac. 673 (1922); Stoll v.
Griffith, 41 Wash. 37, 82 Pac. 1025 (1905).
"Smith v. Smith, 68 Iowa 608, 27 N. W. 780 (1886); Hoyt v. Lightbody, 98
Minn. 189, 108 N. W. 843 (1906).
1836 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1948).
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linquent before the plaintiff had acquired his interest. There is also a
divergence of opinion as to when the co-tenancy is terminated. Some
jurisdictions hold that, after the period of redemption has expired and a
tax deed has been issued bona fide to a stranger, one co-tenant may purchase the tax title for his own exclusive benefit.' 9 Others require that,
in addition to the issuance of a tax deed to a stranger, there must be an
eviction of the co-tenant from the land, thus severing any possessory interests of the co-tenants. 20 Of course, in neither case can one co-tenant
affect an exclusive purchase from a stranger accomplished through fraud
or collusion. 2 ' The Florida Court has indicated in a dictum in Spencer
v. Spencer2 2 that an eviction by the stranger, even in the absence of
fraud, is necessary to terminate the co-tenancy relation.23
A limitation that many courts have recognized arises when the cotenants acquire their interests by different instruments and at different
times. In such event the fiduciary relationship between them is not
implied, with the result that either of them, upon purchasing a tax title,
can claim the exclusive benefit of it.24 This limitation is usually construed strictly; it has been held that, when a confidential relationship did
in fact exist between tenants in common at the time of acquisition of the
tax title, 2 5 or if one had at that time knowledge respecting the title superior to that of the other, 2 6 the general rule will be applied. Similarly,
some opinions in other jurisdictions indicate that, if the purchasing cotenant is in possession even though he acquired his interest under a dif"0Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me. 529 (1849); Reinboth v. Zerbe Run Imp. Co., 29
Pa. 139 (1858); Kirkpatrick v. Mathiot, 4 W. & S. 251 (Pa. 1842); Keele v.
Cunningham, 2 Heisk. 288 (Tenn. 1871); cf. Battin v. Woods, 27 W. Va. 58 (1885);
see Alexander v. Sully, 50 Iowa 192 (1878) (none of co-tenants in possession).
2
"Allen v. Allen, 114 Wis. 615, 91 N. W. 218 (1902); Bush v. Bush, 275 S. W.
1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
"1Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me. 529 (1849).
"36 So.2d 424, 426 (1948).

"'See note 20 supra.
"'St. Mary's Power Co. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 133 Mich. 470,
95 N. W. 554 (1903) ; Boynton v. Veldman, 131 Mich. 555, 91 N. W. 1022 (1902)
(laches in asserting rights); Brant v. Nugent, 100 N. J. Eq. 396, 135 AtI. 780
(1927); see Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388, 407 (N. Y. 1821); Allen v.
Allen, 114 Wis. 615, 91 N. W. 218, 222 (1902).

"5See United N. J. R. & Canal Co. v. Consolidated Fruit jar Co., 65 N. J. Eq.

778, 55 At!. 46, 48 (1906).
"'See Hodgson v. Federal Oil Development Co., 274 U. S. 15, 19 (1927); FREEar,
CO=z ANCY §159.
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27
ferent instrument and at a different time, the general rule still applies.
28
The Florida
Other courts have held that the possession is immaterial.
Court has had no opportunity to consider this question, but it may be
well to observe that the tendency is to break away from this distinction
and to hold that the single unity of the right to possession, in instances
of acquisition of interests by different instruments and at different times,
is sufficient to imply a relation of trust and confidence between the co29
tenants.
In a few cases, in which thl taxes have been assessed separately
against each co-tenant's undivided interest, either has been allowed to
purchase the tax title to the interest of his co-tenant, in the absence of
fraud or collusion. 3 0 This is clearly noted in those instances in which
the co-tenants are in possession of distinct sections of the undivided tract
and are assessed separately.3 1 In such event, each co-tenant is under a
duty to pay his own taxes only and not those assessed against the
others. 3 2 This absence of liability for the taxes of others eliminates any
impediment to the right to purchase. A further result of separate assessment is a reduction in the force of the argument based on interdependence in the protection of the title, thus minimizing the necessity for
implying a confidential relationship.

III.

JoINT RE

MAINDEWMN IN EXPECTANCY AND THE LrvE ESTATE

There is little authority as to whether a joint remainderman in expectancy will be permitted to purchase a tax title to the whole fee and
claim exclusive benefit therefrom against his co-remaindermen. Most
cases involving this point have held that such a purchase enures to the
benefit of the co-remaindermen. 3 3 These decisions apparently rest on
"See Dahlstrom v. Beard Fruit Co., 73 Wash. 13, 131 Pac. 450 (1913) (on the
theory that the possession of the one co-tenant would lead the other co-tenants to
believe that the co-tenant in possession would pay taxes).
29
2

Cohea v. Hemingway, 71 Miss. 22, 14 So. 734 (1893).
'Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black 613 (U. S. 1862); Smith v. Borradaile, 30 N. M.

62, 227 Pac. 602 (1922); Gass v. Waterhouse, 61 S. W. 450 (Tenn. 1900); cf.
Montague v. Selb, 106 Ill 49 (1883).
"oHanley v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 235 Fed. 769 (D. C. Idaho 1916);
Bennet v. North Colo. Spring Land & Improvement Co., 23 Colo. 470, 48 Pac. 812
(1897) ; see McCready v. Fredericksen,
Butler v. Porter, 13 Mich. 292 (1865).
"nDavis v. Cass, 72 Miss. 985, 18
"2See Oglesby v. Hofliser, 76 Cal.
'Johns v. Johns, 93 ALa. 239, 9

41 Utah 388, 126 Pac. 316, 318 (1912). But see
So. 454 (1895).
136, 18 Pac. 146 (1888).
So. 419 (1890); Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho
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an implied relation of trust and confidence between joint remaindermen,
even before interests vest in possession. 3 4 Thus the same rule applied to
co-tenants in possession is applied to joint remaindermen in expectancy.
Nevertheless, it has at least twice been held that a purchase by one coremainderman will not enure to the benefit of other co-remaindermen.
The theory of these cases rests on the questionable premise that the
relation of trust and confidence normally implied between co-owners of
land arises exclusively from a mutual duty to pay taxes, as distinct
from mutual interest, and that since this duty rests on the life tenant
alone, no relation of trust and confidence should be implied between coremaindermen. s * This view opens the door to sharp practice among coremaindermen to the same extent obtaining in the case of co-tenants.
The relation of trust and confidence and the obligation to deal fairly
arise as much from community of interest as from a mutual obligation
to pay taxes. 3 6
If, then, the purchase of a tax title by one co-remainderman enures
to the benefit of the others,3 7 is the purchasing co-remainderman entitled to exclusive possession during the life estate or should the life tenant be restored to possession?3s A West Virginia case 3 9 holds that the
remainderman owes a fiduciary duty toward the life tenant 4 o as well
as to his co-remainderman, and that accordingly the purchase of a tax
title by one co-remainderman amounts merely to a redemption of the
property for all sharing in the estate, regarded as a whole. 4 1 It follows that the life tenant is restored to possession; in other words, the
remainderman-life tenant relationship is treated on the same basis as
576, 123 Pac. 487 (1912); Patty v..Payne, 178 Iowa 593, 159 N. W. 1012 (1916);
Fox v. Coon, 64 Mliss. 465, 1 So. 629 (1886); Harrison v. Harrison, 56 Miss. 174
(1878); Clark v. Lindsey, 47 Ohio St. 437, 25 N. E. 422 (1890) (under statute pro-

viding for a forfeiture of life estate if life tenant allowed land to be sold for taxes).
"See note 33 supra.
'Crawford v. Meis, 123 Iowa 610, 99 N. W. 186 (1904) (distinguished in Patty
v. Payne, 178 Iowa 593, 159 N. W. 1012 (1916), at least when remainderman is not
in possession); Jinkiaway v. Ford, 93 Kan. 797, 145 Pac. 885 (1915).
"'See note 17 supra; Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388 (N. Y. 1821).
T
See note 33 supra.

8
"A remainderman in severalty may purchase tax title and exclude the life
tenant in the absence of fraud, bad faith or officiousness. Duffley v. McCaskey,

345 Mo. 550, 134 S. W.2d 62 (1939).
"Callihan v. Russell, 66 W. Va. 524, 66 N. E. 695 (1909).
"See Hall v. Hall, 173 Minn. 128, 216 N. W. 798 (1927).
"Because of peculiar circumstances, Callihan v. Russell, 66 W. Va. 524, 66 N. E.
697 (1909), cannot very well be considered a concrete authority on this proposition.
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that of co-tenants in possession. It is doubtful, however, whether there
is any basis for holding that the remaindermen owe an implied fiduciary
duty toward the life tenant, inasmuch as they do not enjoy the advantages
of possession and are not charged with such responsibilities as payment
42
of taxes and protection of the title for other interests in the land.

If

no implied fiduciary duty exists on the part of the remaindermen toward
the life tenant, 4 3 the soundness of the concept that a remainderman can
redeem no less than the estate as a whole is open to serious doubt. An
opposite result was reached in a Mississippi case, 4 4 in which without a
thorough discussion the court held that a co-remainderman purchasing
a tax title acquired thereby the remaining portion of the life estate, and
that the other co-remaindermen could not claim any benefit under the
tax title until the death of the life tenant. At this point their remainder
came into possession. Although no other case has been found discussing the correctness of this latter holding, it seems preferable upon
analysis. The precise question is whether the disqualification to purchase the remainder extends to the life estate as well.
In most jurisdictions, including Florida, a tax title operates to give
a new and independent fee simple title from the state. This terminates
all rights to the land, 4 5 including remainder interests. 40 The courts,
however, impose a disqualification to acquire a tax title both when this
will enable the purchaser to take advantage of his own default in payment of taxes, so as to cut out the interests of others in the land, 4 7 and
when it will enable him to take an inequitable advantage of the delinquent taxpayer. 48 Therefore, if a remainderman owes neither a duty
to pay taxes on the land 4 9 nor any fiduciary duty toward the life ten"'See Jinkiaway v. Ford, 93 Kan. 797, 145 Pac. 885, 888 (1915); 3 SiAs, FuTURE
§637 (1936).
"See note 41 supra.
"'Fox v. Coon, 64 Miss. 465, 1 So. 629 (1886); see Johns v. Johns, 93 Ala. 239,
9 So. 419, 421 (1890) (the purchasing remainderman's right to possession of the
life estate was not challenged by the life tenant).
"FLA. STAT. §194.53 (1941) ; Torryson v. Dutton, 137 Fla. 683, 188 So. 805 (1939);
see Note 75, A.L.R. 416 (1931).
"Cummings v. Cummings, 91 Fed. 602 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1899); Watkins v.
Green, 101 Mich. 493, 60 N. W. 44 (1894); Hazlip v. Nunnery, 29 So. 821 (Miss.
1901); State v. Mathews, 68 W. Va. 89, 69 S. E. 644 (1910).
""See note 1 supra.
"See note 2 supra.
"Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 550, 134 S. W.2d 62 (1939); In re Gaffer, 254
App. Div. 448, 5 N. Y. S.2d 671 (1938); In re McCarty, 158 Misc. 287, 285 N. Y.
INTERESTS
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ant,5o the disqualification as to the life tenant should not be imposed
upon him; but, when there is an implied relation of trust and confidence
between co-remaindermen, 51 even though there is no mutual duty to pay
taxes, 5 2 the disqualification of either one as against the other should be
imposed. Applying this reasoning, the purchasing co-remaindermen
should be able to acquire exclusive possession of the remaining portion of
the life estate as against both the life tenant, since no disqualification to
purchase tax title exists as to him, and as against the other co-remaindermen, since their right to possession does not accrue until the duath of
the life tenant.5 3 The life tenant would be in no position to assert that
the tax title also enured to his benefit, because it was through his own
default and neglect that the taxes became delinquent and the land was
sold for taxes. 5 4 Nor would this result jeopardize the interests of the
other co-remaindermen since, upon a threat to these interests, a bill in
equity to quiet title would lie to preserve the remainder interest and insure its vesting at the proper time.5 5 Had one remainderman purchased
the interest of the life tenant by deed and gone into possession, their
50
position would be the same.
Some light is shed on this problem by a Florida statute 57 which
provides that any portion of land, or any interest therein contained, may
be redeemed according to the proportionate value of the part or parts so redeemed. This statute was apparently designed to permit a redemption of a
geographical portion of the land, and it does not strictly apply to the
question of whether a purchase of a tax title by one co-remainderman
automatically enures to the benefit of the life tenant along with the other
co-remaindermen. Inasmuch, however, as the person redeeming may
salvage a geographical part without obtaining the whole from a quantitative standpoint, it may well be argued that there would likewise
Supp. 641 (1936) (duty to pay taxes rests on the life tenant).
"See note 43 supra; Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 550, 134 S. W2d 62
(1939).
5
'See Note 33 supra.
"'See note 49 subra.
"Weed v. Knox, IS7 Fla. 896, 27 So.2d 419 (1946).
5
See Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 550, 134 S. W.2d 62 (1939).
"Commercial Bldg. Co. v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143, 112 So. 378 (1927).
58Frank v. Frank, 305 Ill. 181, 137 X. E. 151 (1922); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 80 Md. 115, 30 Atl. 607 (1894) (no merger of estates in favor of other
remainderman when one of them purchases the interest of the life tenant by deed).
'T r& STAT. §194.53 (1941).
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be no objection to a redemption of a qualitative share of the full ownership therein. If this inference is followed, a purchase of a tax title by
one remainderman, although amounting to a mere redemption as to
other remaindermen, need not necessarily be a redemption as to the
interest of the life tenant.
In Spencer v. Spenceras a homesteader died in possession of homestead realty, leaving a widow and several children surviving. Several
years after his death, one of the sons acquired a tax title to the property
through another person and went into possession without molesting the
widow. Some years later the widow died. The son continued in possession for several more years and then bought a suit to quiet title against
other brothers and sisters. The Court held that all the children were
entitled to the land merely by applying the general rule, on the theory
that they were co-tenants in possession immediatey upon the death of
the father. Under the statute governing descent of homestead realty59
the widow took a life estate with vested remainders in the children.
Accordingly it was then necessary to determine whether one co-remainderman could purchase a tax title against other co-remaindermen; but
the Court for some reason failed to note the point. Decisions in most
jurisdictions sustained the result. 0° Since the widow, however, was dead
at the time of the suit and the remainder had vested in possession, the
question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to exclusive possession
until the death of the widow was moot. Nevertheless, it might have
been material to determine whether the plaintiff's alleged adverse possession for over seven years ran against the remaindermen, had the pleadings raised this point, or to rule on the sufficiency of notice of his
adverse claim against them. 61
IV.

CONCLUSION

The principles discussed should not be regarded as concrete rules
of property to be followed in every instance. Since the right of co-tenants
to share in the benefit of a tax title purchased by one co-tenant is one
of equitable cognizance, that right may be defeated by laches.6 2 A
5'36 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1948).
"FLA. STAT. §731.27 (1941).
"0See note 33 supra.

8

Commercial Bldg. Co. v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143, 112 So. 378 (1927).

82

Gilb v. O'Neill, 225 Ala. 92, 142 So. 397 (1932); Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho

576, 123 Pac. 487 (1912); Lee v. Fox, 36 Ky. 171 (1838); Harrell v. Harrell, 174

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949

9

